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Abstract
In Portugal, Civil Servants may have a differential utilization of health services due to their supplementary Health
Subsystem (ADSE), which grants them access to health services in the private sector at lower price. We exploit the
impact of this double coverage on the demand for Portuguese Public Emergency Departments (ED), following the
recent increase in co-payments for public health care services in Portugal.
Using detailed ED level data from three different EDs, one for each level of the Portuguese ED care, we rely on a
difference-in-differences strategy, under the assumption that both civil servants and National Health Service (NHS)
users were targeted by the public co-payment increase, but just the former have a low-cost alternative in the
private sector that they can use when prices increase in the NHS.
We found that the existence of a low-price alternative in the private sector caused ED demand to decrease among
ADSE beneficiaries following a policy that increased co-payments in public NHS hospitals. Specifically, we show that
this decrease was only significant for conditions which have arguably the closest substitutes in the private sector
– the low and intermediate-severity conditions – and to patients who lived closer to the ED and to whom the
co-payment was the largest share of the ED visit cost.
These findings cast some concerns over the equity of the Portuguese Health System, since civil servants increasingly
opt out from public health services but must co-fund both the ADSE and the NHS.
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Background
In several countries with universal National Health
Service (NHS) funded by taxation, some public or private
subsystems, mutual funds or insurance schemes financed
by a mix of employers and employees’ contributions sub-
sist. In the vast majority of these countries, opting out
from the NHS is not possible and, therefore, these health
subsystems represent a secondary layer of coverage, on
top of the NHS, which usually grants access to a variety of
services in the private sector [1, 2].
There is nowadays a vast plethora of research that under-
lines a positive association between additional insurance
coverage and healthcare utilization [3–8]. In Portugal,
some researchers [9, 10] have found that the double
coverage that beneficiaries of the Civil Servants’
Health Subsystem (ADSE) are entitled to increases
their probability of using health services, particularly
in the private sector where their insurance has a network
of preferential providers at a lower cost.
To our knowledge, however, any differential behavior on
the demand for care among these double insured patients
when co-payments for the public sector increase has never
been reported. Economic theory predicts that these pa-
tients may be more cost-sensitive to co-payments’ increases
in the NHS because they have a low-cost alternative in the
private sector that they can use when prices increase in the
NHS. Besley and Coate [11] were the firsts to argue that
the public provision of healthcare may be redistributive
when low income patients resort to public facilities,
whereas high income citizens, who contribute to subsidiz-
ing the public services through income taxes, opt out to
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the private sector. Recently, this hypothesis that double in-
sured individuals free up public resources by opting out
from the NHS has been tested by several authors: in the
Italian voluntary health insurance market, Fabbri and
Monfardini [12] found that double insured patients con-
sumed more private services while simultaneously reduced
public demand, as did Gertler and Sturm in Jamaica [13];
and in Denmark, Sogaard and colleagues reported that
employer-paid health insurance led to a 10 % reduction of
public hospitals and substitution with private hospitals [14].
We take advantage of a recent policy that increased co-
payments in the Portuguese NHS to test this hypothesis in
the context of our country. In November 2011, the
Portuguese Government ordered an increase in the NHS
co-payments (“taxas moderadoras”) for several health
services, namely the Public Emergency Departments (ED).
This was one of the policies put forward by the Portuguese
Government following the Portuguese financial crisis, and
had the explicit aim of controlling NHS demand, namely
in Hospital EDs where the number of non-urgent visits
was close to 40 % of total ED demand [15].
Considering that ADSE beneficiaries have the advan-
tage of resorting to a low-price private alternative within
their plan’s network, while single insured NHS patient
have to pay the full price of care in the private sector, a
policy that increases co-payments for NHS services may
induce a larger reduction on demand for Public health
services among ADSE beneficiaries compared to single
insured NHS patients. Using a detailed database from three
different-level EDs, we rely on a difference-in-differences ap-
proach to test this hypothesis, under the assumption that,
during the period of the co-payments’ increase, the main
difference between ADSE (our treatment group) and NHS
(our control group) sub-populations was the former’s possi-
bility of using their networks’ health services to “escape”
from the increase in prices in the public sector.
Portuguese context
Portuguese have the right to health protection through a
NHS, which should be general, universal and almost free of
charge, according to patients’ social and economic status.
The non-gratuity of the System translates into the existence
of co-payments (“taxas moderadoras”) that some patients –
those who are not exempt due to their social or economic
situation – have to pay when accessing the NHS services.
The Portuguese Emergency Network comprises three
levels of care – polyvalent EDs, medical–surgical EDs and
basic EDs– which differ in terms of the complexity of the
cases they receive, the resources they have (e.g. human re-
sources, lab and imaging exams), the price the Government
pays the hospitals for each ED visit and the level of co-
payment required to each patient. The polyvalent emer-
gency services are those that receive the most complex
patients. Basic emergency services receive only patients
with simple cases. Medical–surgical emergency services are
at an intermediate level, receiving cases with some com-
plexity, but referring the most complex ones to polyvalent
emergency services, according to specific clinical criteria
(e.g. a patient presenting in a Basic ED with appendicitis is
referred to a medical–surgical ED; a polytraumatized, if
taken to a medical–surgical ED, is referred to a polyvalent
ED) and pre-determined referral networks (a basic ED al-
ways refers to the same medical–surgical ED, which always
refers to the same polyvalent ED). The differences in the
complexity of the cases treated in each type of ED also
translate into differences in the value of the co-payments.
On January 1, 2012, co-payments for several health services
provided by the Portuguese NHS were significantly
increased. For ED, co-payments were increased be-
tween 75 and 108 %, depending on the classification
(degree of complexity) of the ED: co-payments for
basic ED visits were established at €15 (an increase of
75 %), co-payments for medical–surgical ED visits
were established at €17.5 (an increase of 103 %) and
co-payments for polyvalent ED visits were established
at €20 (an increase of 108 %).
One other feature of the Portuguese Health System
which is important for our work is the existence of health
subsystems, alongside the NHS. These are health insur-
ance schemes that were established before the NHS and
that now represent a second layer of health protection for
some citizens. Usually these give easy access to a wide
range of private providers at a lower price. Naturally, re-
garding the NHS, these citizens are subject to the same
conditions as any NHS patient: they have to pay the
services’ co-payments (as long as they are not eligible for
exemption) and they have waiting times for outpatient
consultation or surgery.
The focus of our work is on the Civil Servants’ health
subsystem (ADSE), the largest subsystem in Portugal, cov-
ering a population of 1,3 million citizens (more than 10 %
of the population). ADSE is funded both by employer
(State) and employees’ contributions, with additional trans-
fers from the State budget. Increases in the level of both
employer and civil servants’ contributions have recently
been made: from an employees’ contribution of 1,5 % of in-
come in the beginning of 2013, the rate has increased to
3,5 % in 2014; and public services started a contribution of
2,5 % of their civil servants’ income in 2011. Due to this
increase in public services’ contributions, Government
Budget transfers to the ADSE ceased in 2012 and the
system became self-sustainable for the first time.1 ADSE
beneficiaries may access private services by two ways: first,
there is a list of private providers with whom ADSE has
agreements and where access is almost free (they only have
to pay small co-payments); second, they may access other
providers that are not in the list, pay the service fee and
submit it for reimbursement.
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Methods
Our study used administrative electronic data obtained
from three Portuguese hospital EDs in the North of
Portugal: a Polyvalent, a Medical-Surgical and a Basic ED,
representing therefore all the levels within the Portuguese
ED network.
The Hospital de São João is the largest academic hos-
pital in the North of Portugal. Its polyvalent ED has an
average volume of 150 000 annual visits and is at the top
of the referral network for 41 of the 86 municipalities in
the North of the country, covering a population of about
1.7 million. The other two are smaller proximity hospi-
tals, which together serve a population of about 250 000.
Hospital Conde de São Bento in Santo Tirso has a basic
ED and Hospital São João de Deus in Famalicão has a
medical–surgical ED. The three EDs included in our
sample account for almost 10 % of the ED visits in
Portugal, especially because of HSJ which is one of the
hospitals with the highest ED volume in the country.
We compared ED demand made, respectively, by
ADSE beneficiaries and NHS patients in the three EDs
for a period of 6 months before the co-payments’ change
(January to June, 2011) and an equal period after the
changes (January to June, 2012). Moreover, since our
aim was to measure the effect of the co-payment’s in-
crease, we selected only patients that ought to pay the
co-payment (patients who were not exempt from these
charges), regardless of their payer (ADSE or NHS). We
also excluded from this analysis patients who visited the
ED using other health insurance (e.g. private health insured
individuals or beneficiaries of private health subsystems
such as the Banking Health Subsystem).
For estimating this effect, we resort on a difference-
in-differences approach.
Consider the following general model, without covariates
for the moment:
Y i ¼ β0 þ β1Ti þ β2SUBi þ β3Ti  SUBi; ð1Þ
where Y is our measure of the ED demand (see below); T
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the ED visits were
made in 2012 and 0 if they were in 2011 and captures any
aggregate factors that caused changes in ED demand over
time; SUB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if ED visits
were made by double insured ADSE beneficiaries and 0
for the ED demand by NHS user and captures the differ-
ences in ED demand between these populations before
the payment increase. The DD estimator,β3, gives the dif-
ferences in ED demand between ADSE and NHS patients
after the policy that increased co-payments.
The DD methodology has been widely used in health
economics to estimate the impact of policy interventions,
and specifically in studies that had an aim similar to ours:
Ikenwilo used a DD framework to assess the effect on NHS
utilization of a free dental check-up program in Scotland
[16]; Layte et al. and Nolan evaluated a policy of exempting
patients over 70 y.o. of GP user charges in Ireland [17, 18];
and Chen and Jin examined whether increased insurance
coverage in China led to lower child and maternal mortality
and better school enrollment [19], among many others.
The main assumption behind the DD methodology is that
other changes that have occurred during the period ana-
lyzed affect the intervention and control groups equally.
Similarly, in our study, any change of utilization of Public
EDs by NHS patients and ADSE beneficiaries that is not re-
lated to “the double coverage effect” (the existence of a
low-price private alternative for civil servants) should be
captured by the demand of NHS patients, who don’t have a
network of private providers. Therefore, any difference in
variation on the ED demand between ADSE beneficiaries
and NHS patients, during the period of the increase in co-
payments, should reflect the effect of the existence of a
(low price) private alternative within the ADSE’s network
which could lead to a shift to/from the private sector
among these patients, caused by the public co-payments’
increase. Differences in utilization of Healthcare services
between NHS and ADSE patients are well documented
[9, 10] and even a fairly different average income level is
argued to exist between the two groups [20]. Such factors
should not bias our results since we studied the demand
between 2011 and 2012 and those different utilization pat-
terns already existed in 2011 and are then captured by β2.
2
We analyze ED demand using the weekly number of
ED visits (our outcome measure), made by each of our
groups (NHS and ADSE patients), in each year. We use
a negative binomial regression to estimate our model,
since our outcomes were counts and their distribution
was more overdispersed than would be found in a
Poisson distribution [21]. Therefore, the coefficients of
interest in eq.1) can be interpreted as the log of the
expected number of ED visits per week, with negative
values indicating a lower ED demand.
Covariates included demographic variables, such as
sex and average age at admission, ED demand related
variables, such as the referrals by the Primary Health
Care network and the proportion of patients discharged
home, and a week variable, to account for seasonal
effects (a description of these variables is presented in
Appendix 1).
We further extended our main model to account for
two factors that may be relevant to our analysis: the pa-
tients’ severity when seeking for care and the patients’
distance to ED (as a measure of the distance-cost pa-
tients had to incur, on top of the co-payment).
There is extensive evidence that patients’ sensitivity to
co-payments differs according to the nature of their health
problems [22, 23]; Duarte [23], for instance, found that
acute conditions, such as appendicitis or cholecystitis - the
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typical situations that drive patients into the ED with high-
severity conditions – are virtually price-inelastic (ie. their
demand does not decrease after co-payment increases).
Considering this, we classified ED visits using the
Manchester Triage’s color on the admission - “green” and
“blue” visits were considered low-severity visits, “yellow”
were considered intermediate-severity visits and “orange”
and “red” were considered high-severity visits. We excluded
the Manchester Triage’s “white” group visits, since they are
more difficult to classify according to their price-elasticity,
ie., they may vary between a “more price-sensitive” and “less
price-sensitive” visits (these are patients who had a formal
indication from their discharge doctor to return to the ED
in the following days for a reevaluation).
Similarly, there is a vast literature positing a substantial
effect of distance-costs on ED demand [24]. In Portugal,
where direct costs are small and there is a wide exemption
scheme in place, distance costs play an important role in
modulating ED demand [25, 26]. For taking these costs
into account, we classified ED visits into low, intermediate
and high-distance ED demand using tertiles of distance to
the ED (measured as the shortest route in Kilometres
between the patients’ municipality center and the ED).
STATA Ver.12© was used to estimate the multivariate
model. ArcGIS (v.10.0, Environmental Systems Research
Institute, CA) was used for distance computation.
Results
The data
Table 1 shows the number of ED visits, stratified by insurer
(NHS and ADSE) and visit’s severity, for each of the periods
we analyzed, and the variations that occurred between 2011
and 2012. From 2011 to 2012, overall ED visits decreased
by 9 %, with considerably higher decreases in ADSE
beneficiaries’ visits (22 %). Furthermore, this decrease on
ED demand was higher for low-severity visits (-25 %) than
for intermediate (-21 %) and high-severity visits (-18 %).
The DD model
A summary of our difference-in-difference model estimates
is presented in Table 2. We test for overdispersion using a
LR test on the parameter alpha showing that our ED
demand variable is over-dispersed and is not sufficiently de-
scribed by the simpler Poisson distribution. The full model,
presented in Appendix 1, highlights the non-significance of
demographic and ED-related covariates that could cause
ED demand to change during the period of our analysis.
The second row of Table 2 presents the DD coefficient β3
(an estimate of the effect of having double health coverage,
as explained in our methodology), following the policy that
increased co-payments for ED. In non-linear models, the
interaction terms are not directly interpretable in terms of
intensity and statistical significance [27]. For a rigorous ana-
lysis, we compute the marginal effects and transform them
into semi-elasticities for easiness of interpretation.
Table 2 shows that the DD coefficient β3 was statisti-
cally significant and negative. The policy of increasing
co-payments was associated with a decrease in demand
of 18 % among ADSE patients, after controlling for the
demand made by NHS patients.
On Table 3, we test whether this differential ED demand
among ADSE and NHS patients after the co-payments’
increase was sensitive to the severity of ED visits and the
distance patients had to travel to the ED. Our results show
that only on low and intermediary-severity demand was the
difference on ED demand statistically different between
ADSE and NHS patients, after the increase in co-payments;
specifically, ADSE patients had a 20 and 15 % reduction in
demand in 2012 for low and intermediate-severity condi-
tions, respectively. High-severity conditions reduced 3 %,
yet this effect was not statistically significant. Similar
results emerge for distance: the decrease in ED demand
Table 1 ED visits according to Subsystem (NHS vs. ADSE) and
Manchester Triage
2011 2012
Number of visits (NHS + ADSE) 48 278 43 940
YEAR-on-YEAR -8,96 %
NHS ADSE
2011 2012 2011 2012
Number of visits 41 292 37 796 3160 2472
YEAR-on-YEAR -8,47 % -21,77 %
Low-severity visits 14 981 13 807 1031 775
YEAR-on-YEAR -7,84 % -24,83 %
Intermediate-severity visits 21 860 20 240 1753 1390
YEAR-on-YEAR -7,41 % -20,71 %
High-severity visits 4451 3749 376 307
YEAR-on-YEAR -15,77 % -18,35 %
Table 2 Negative binomial regression – main coefficients
Coefficient (SE) IRR (95 % CI)
2012 -0.167 (0.030)*** 0.924 (0.868 – 0.983)**
ADSE - 2.666 (0.098)*** 0.076 (0.062 – 0.092)***
2012 ∗ ADSE -0.176 (0.038)*** 0.839 (0.779 – 0.903)***
alpha 0.004 (0.001)***
Pseudo R2 0.3504
Note: These are the results of the negative binomial regression. The dispersion
parameter, alpha, is significantly greater than zero based on a likelihood-ratio
chi-square test. The number of observations is 104 (number of ED visits/week).
Column 2 presents the average marginal effects transformed into semi-elasticities:
these give an approximation of how much ED demand is expected to increase or
decrease for a unit change in the independent variable. Robust standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Column 3 presents the multiplicative effects in
IRR. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: **p < 5 %.***p < 1 %
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among ADSE patients was only statistically significant
for patients who lived closer to the ED. For these pa-
tients, after the increase in co-payments, ED demand
reduced 20 %.
Discussion
In this study, we estimate the effect that the recent increase
in co-payments had on the demand for ED care by double
insured ADSE (civil servants) patients, who have a private
alternative in their plan’s network. To our knowledge, even
though co-payments are becoming increasingly widespread
among European Health Systems, we are the first to assess
the impact of an increase in NHS co-payments on these
subpopulations’ demand for health services.
We used a difference-in-differences design to estimate
this “double coverage effect”, using the NHS patients as
the control group. Our main assumption is that, during
the period of the co-payment’s increase, the only differ-
ence between NHS and ADSE patients is the latter’s
opportunity to use a low-price private provider within
their plan’s network, as an alternative to the increase in
price in the public sector.
We found that following the increase in co-payments,
ADSE beneficiaries had a sizeable decrease on Public ED
demand, compared to NHS patients. Furthermore, this
decrease was only due to low and intermediary-severity
ED visits (“blue”, “green” and “yellow” ED visits, according
to the Manchester Triage), which are usually conditions
that have a closer substitute in private hospitals and
clinics. This strengthens our hypothesis that ADSE benefi-
ciaries shifted their ED demand to private alternatives
within their plan’s network following the co-payment in-
crease in public hospitals in 2012. Moreover, we did not
find this decrease in demand among emergent ED epi-
sodes. Two arguments may explain this finding: firstly,
most emergent ED conditions (regardless of the insur-
ance) are transported to the hospital by the National
Emergency Medical Service (INEM) that only refers pa-
tients to public hospitals. Furthermore, there is extensive
evidence [23, 25] that high-severity conditions are virtually
price-inelastic, so their demand should not be affected by
minor variations in co-payments.
Additionally, we also found that ADSE patients who
lived closer to the ED were the ones who had the highest
decreases in demand. This may be due to the share that
co-payments have in the total cost of the ED visit for
these patients (ie. they virtually have no distance-costs)
or to the fact that patients who live in the metropolis
have arguably more and closer alternatives in the private
sector than patients who live in rural areas.3
On top of our findings of a decrease on public ED
demand, ADSE reported an increase of 12 % in consulta-
tions per capita in private providers in 2012 (and more
than 20 % in private emergency departments), which re-
inforces our hypothesis of reallocation of demand from
the public to the private sector after the increase in NHS
co-payments [28].
Our evidence on opting-out behaviour by double
insured ADSE patients is consistent with the work of
previous authors and provides another practical ex-
ample of the Besley and Coate (1991) argument [11].
Our finding of a 20 % decrease in double-insured
ADSE demand is sizeable, but is within the range of
the estimates of other authors: Sogaard and colleagues
[14] report that in Denmark employer-paid health in-
surances led to a 10 % reduction of public hospitals
while Fabbri and Monfardini [12] estimate that double
insured Italian patients may reduce public demand by
as much as 70 %.
Our findings have some economic and political
implications.
Firstly, note that, interestingly, this opting out behav-
ior we found following the increase in co-payments for
public EDs highlights an overall discussion that is tak-
ing place in Portugal over the equity of the entire
Health System: if and whenever taxpayer budget helps
financing these subsystems, as regularly happened in
Greece [1] and Spain [2] and in Portugal until 2012
(Fig. 1), the general population feels this is iniquitous
since they are financing the private alternative network
ADSE grants to their beneficiaries; if the employees
(civil servants) and employer (State) contributions are
sufficient for financing the subsystem, ADSE beneficiar-
ies feel this is iniquitous since they are financing both
the subsystem and the NHS but increasingly make use
of the former and cannot opt out from the latter. Since
much of the issue stands along the capability of the
civil servants’ subsystem to become self-sustainable (ie.,
the end of government budget transfers into these
systems’ accounting) and, in this sense, dependent on the
recent increases in civil servants’ contributions to their
subsystem, our findings provide one additional piece of
information for the current discussion over the sustain-
ability and future of the civil servants’ health subsystem.
Table 3 Negative binomial regression according to severity and
distance – DD estimators
Low-severity Intermediate-severity High-severity
2012 ∗ ADSE -0.205 (0.058)*** -0.155 (0.045)** -0.031 (0.087)
Pseudo R2 0.3525 0.3555 0.3645
Low-distance Intermediate-distance High-distance
2012 ∗ ADSE -0.192 (0.047)*** -0.201 (0.058)*** -0.094 (0.061)
Pseudo R2 0.3708 0.3674 0.3501
Note: these are the results of the DD coefficient for ED demand according to
ED severity and distance. Rows 2 and 4 present the marginal effects. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted
as follows: **p < 5 %.***p < 1 %
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Additionally, our findings emphasize the importance of
the existence of a perceived trustworthy alternative, rather
than the mere reliance on demand-side measures, in order
to successfully redirect patients towards more cost-effective
settings. This is extremely important, in light of the recent
research that found limited – if any – impact of the in-
crease in co-payments on the general NHS population [25].
This stresses the need for tailoring supply-side measures at
the primary health care (PHC) setting and at the PHC-ED
gap, as a way of increasing accessibility and freedom of
choice within the Portuguese NHS and enhance the pa-
tients’ reliance in the alternatives to the ED.
Finally, the bigger decrease among low-cost low-
severity ED visits, compared to resource-intensive high-
severity ED visits, points towards skimming in the ED
market. While for the Health subsystem ADSE the net
effect can be null - or even positive if competition leads
to a lower ED visit price -, the impact on public hospitals
is surely negative for at least two main reasons: firstly,
allocative efficiency measures to cope with changes in de-
mand are difficult to implement in the ED setting (e.g. by
law, doctors from other departments have to devote a cer-
tain amount of their week time to work in the ED), result-
ing in high fixed costs; secondly, the payment mechanism
to hospitals for ED production is a severity-independent
flat-fee, which back-of-the-envelope calculations show
that does not even accurately represents the costs of an
average (severity) ED visit [29]. To the extent that Public
EDs have to deal with an average higher case-mix now,
this will certainly incur public hospitals into operating
with (even higher) negative economic profits in this line of
production. This ED skimming calls for changes in the fi-
nancing of Public EDs, namely by establishing severity
and outcome-adjusted payment. Since 2012, the MoH has
made public the intention of including such measures in
the annual production contracts made with public hospi-
tals, yet their formal incorporation is still lacking.
Nevertheless, our paper has some limitations.
The main limitation of comparing utilization rates before
and after the increase in co-payments results from an in-
crease in the number of co-payment exempt citizens in
Portugal that occurred simultaneously to the increase in
co-payments. However, this should only have an impact in
our analysis if non-exempt sub-populations among ADSE
and NHS patients increased by different amounts. Consid-
ering that the main change in the exemption criteria was a
decrease in the wage cut-off for financial exemption [15]
and that civil servants have, on average, a higher income
level compared to private employees [20], our results
may be underestimated (ie. we should find an higher
decrease on ED demand among NHS patients just
because there were less patients who had to pay the co-
payment among NHS patients in 2012). Therefore, this
should not change our main finding of a higher
decrease on ED demand among ADSE beneficiaries
compared to NHS patients.
Furthermore, we did not consider the fact that some
patients that visited the ED using the NHS may be
enrolled in a private health plan and, in this sense, may
be also double insured. If these patients also experienced
a “double coverage effect” following the co-payment
increase, our findings may be underestimated.
Fig. 1 ADSE Funding Structure (data in million euros); source: own elaboration based on ADSE annual reports. Notes: Civil servants’ contributions
did not change between 2011 and 2012. They started to increase after 2012: a first increase from 1,5 % to 2,25 % (as a function of income) in August
2013, a second increase in January 2014 from 2,25 % to 2,5 % and from 2,5 % to 3,5 % in May 2014
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Finally, our study focused on the demand for public EDs
in the North of Portugal. While the effect of the financial
crisis and the reduction of disposable income were prob-
ably higher in this region, the number of private providers
is lower compared to Lisbon, for instance. The overall net
result and the extent to which they are generalizable to
the rest of the country are therefore unknown.
Conclusions
Following an increase in co-payments for Portuguese
Public EDs, we found that civil servants experienced a
sizeable reduction on ED demand, compared to single
insured NHS patients. During this period, the main
difference between these two sub-populations was the
former’s possibility of resorting to a low price private
alternative within their own supplementary insurance
scheme’s network.
In several taxation-based National Health Services, the
co-existence of supplementary health subsystems and
mutual schemes raises concerns about the overall equity
of the Health System, since some citizens subsidize both
their Health subsystem and the universal NHS, but in-
creasingly opt out from using the latter. We show that
an increase in the direct costs of health within the
National Health Service may exacerbate these equity and
efficiency implications and should be taken into account
in the current discussion over the future of the civil
servants’ subsystem.
Endnotes
1Please note that this increase in employers’ contribu-
tion was a change in the State’s funding mechanism of
ADSE with virtually no effect for ADSE users and that
the general public was mostly unaware: before 2011, the
Government financed the health subsystem, ADSE, dir-
ectly through State Budget transfers; after 2011, the
Government continued financing the health subsystem,
but using public services’ (employers’) contributions and
direct transfers from the State Budget ceased.
2To our knowledge, there are no studies that have
compared the quality of private and public EDs. There is
the perception that private EDs have lower waiting
times, at least in part because they have lower demand.
However, there are no reasons to believe that any aspect
of the quality of care in public or private EDs changed
significantly during the period of our analysis.
3For instance, in Porto, the ten largest private hospitals
are, on average, 6,5Km distant from the public ED. The
average distance that patients in our “low-distance” and
“intermediate-distance” groups had to travel was 4Km and
9Km, respectively, which makes the private providers an
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Table 4 Variables description
Variable
2012 =1 if ED visits were made in 2012, 0 otherwise
ADSE =1 if ED visits were made by double insured
ADSE beneficiaries, 0 otherwise
2012 * ADSE =1 if ED visits were made by double insured
ADSE beneficiaries in 2012 (the DiD)
Female the proportion of ED visits that were made by
women (per week)
PHC origin the proportion of ED visits that were originated
from the PHC network (per week)
Discharge Referral the proportion of ED visits that were discharged
home (per week)
Distance the average distance patients had to travel to the
ED (weekly ED demand)
Age the average ED patients’ age (weekly ED demand)
Week the number of the week, in each year
Table 5 Full model estimates
Variable B IRR (95 % CI)
2012 -0.080 (0.032)** 0.924 (0.868 – 0.983)**
ADSE -2.578 (0.100)*** 0.076 (0.062 – 0.092)***
2012 * ADSE -0.176 (0.038)*** 0.839 (0.779 – 0.903)***
Female -0.016 (0.338) 0.984 (0.508 – 1.913)
Distance 0.004 (0.005) 1.004 (0.995 – 1.013)
Age 0.005 (0.008) 1.005 (0.991 – 1.020)
PHC origin -1.523 (1.661) 0.218 (0.008 – 5.652)
Discharge Referral 0.536 (0.274) 1.708 (0.998 – 2.924)
Week -0.002 (0.001) 0.998 (0.779 – 1.001)
Pseudo R2 0.3503
alpha 0.004***
Note: these are the results of the full model. The second column presents the
coefficients directly extracted from the model (not the marginal effects). The
last row shows a likelihood ratio test that alpha equals zero–the likelihood
ratio test comparing this model to a Poisson model. Statistical significance is
denoted as follows: **p < 5 %.***p < 1 %
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